Church of England should not make reproductive potential essential to marriage

Having researched Christian attitudes to human fertility, when I saw the recent Church of England statement (7 December 2012) on marriage my attention immediately focused on a phrase that looks dangerously close to the idea that a marriage is validated by its potential for reproductivity (an ideology that can be labelled “reproductionism”). My reaction appears below:

The C of E statement includes in their “definition of marriage” as an essential feature:

“the biological union of man and woman which potentially brings to the relationship the fruitfulness of procreation”

The (anonymous) authors may think the word “potentially” sufficient to avoid linking a marriage’s value to its reproductivity, but there are many people whose infertility is discernibly permanent prior to marriage i.e. they completely lack potential fertility. I want to alert the C of E authors to the danger of using these ideas, by mentioning some of the disturbing implications and historical consequences.

For example, the ideology raises questions about eligibility to begin a marriage for the following kinds of people:

  • A permanently infertile person (for example a castrated man, a woman who has had a hysterectomy, or is past the menopause, and the elderly).
  • A man and woman who intend to remain childless or childfree (for whatever reason).

It also has implications for people who have been married for years:

  • If a husband or wife is infertile for ten years is that grounds for divorce? (That was one view among diverse medieval rabbinic interpretations of the text “be fruitful and multiply”.)
  • If a childless husband and wife fail to seek medical fertility treatment, is the marriage invalidated?

These are just a few of the grotesque implications.

The church should steer well away from this. I wonder why the C of E authors chose to dredge up that line of argument. I understand their primary concern is about a different issue and I imagine they do not intend to follow the logical implications by adding fertility-related criteria for men and women seeking marriage. Even so, in a context of defining marriage their mention of a potential for biological reproduction as distinctive of the essence of marriage is unhelpful. They are lending credibility to procreationism (and natalism). A marriage which husband and wife know in advance will be childless is just as valid as any other marriage.

I urge the Church of England to amend their statement.

The difference between natalism and beliefs that only incidentally raise birth rates

As a stopgap until I write specifically on this question, here is an extract from my PhD that addresses it in passing.

Natalism is the advocacy of a high birth rate within a community. Urging parents to have additional children is an obvious manifestation, but there are other parameters affecting the birth rate and efforts to influence these can also be natalist.*1* These proximate determinants of fertility concern womens’ lives and are primarily the percentage who become mothers, the age at which childbearing starts, and the duration of any interruptions (child spacing).

In traditional societies these are shaped by the proportion never marrying, the age at marriage,*2* the interval before widows remarry, physical infertility, and the fertility-suppressant effect of breastfeeding (postpartum infecundability) which was extended for two years or more in many cultures. How much other methods of family planning were used in pre-modern societies is debated.

In the modern world contraception became (and remains) very significant. Other factors still contribute to limiting births, but late marriage is far less important than it once was because with a small ideal family size most women complete their family despite starting at a later age.

From page 262 of Baird, David. “Fertility and Ageing.” Human Reproduction Update 11.3 (2005)

From page 262 of Baird, David. “Fertility and Ageing.” Human Reproduction Update 11.3 (2005)
261-76.

However within US natalist subcultures, aspiring to a larger number of children, age again becomes important. The graph overleaf of births in (pre-modern) “natural fertility” populations (Baird 262) shows why age at marriage, and spacing between successive children, are determinants of completed fertility among natalists.

All the factors noted above can be regarded as levers potentially usable by natalists to influence birth rates.

A minor factor but one with rising significance, especially in the USA and Israel, is medical treatment of infertility. For example, Susan Kahn finds that a “convergence of pronatalist social pressure, rabbinic permission, and economic accessibility makes fertility treatment all but inevitable for infertile ultraorthodox women in Israel” (294). By contrast, I have not found advocacy of fertility treatment among Protestant natalists, on the contrary some oppose it as unnatural.*3*

I make a distinction between effect and motive, and describe below seven ideas which in practice raise birth rates but are not necessarily natalist. Any of these ideas can be held independently or in combination with others. The ideas are:

first, that marriage is normative, and most people should marry;

second, that youthful marriage is the ideal;

third, that seeking to reproduce is essential to the constitution of a valid marriage;

fourth, that any conjugal act without intention to reproduce is perverted;

and fifth, that sterilization is self-harm.

The sixth and seventh ideas condemn the use of artificial contraceptives*4* and procedures leading to abortion.

In practice these ideas may increase birth rates, for example by disparaging singleness, encouraging earlier marriage, stigmatizing the childless, and hindering family planning.

However they should not be classified as natalist unless the writer’s motives include a desire for high fecundity.*5* If the expressed concern is instead only about, for example, promiscuity, self-harm, fornication, selfishness, or killing the unborn, then the idea is not natalist, even if based on the same OT fruitful verses.

The first and seventh ideas are common among conservative Protestants. A small minority of Protestants adhere to the fourth idea (procreationism) and so avoid family planning: most of these are also natalist, and they can be called unlimited natalists.*6*

The distinction between natalism and beliefs that incidentally affect birth rates will now be clarified. The fourth idea, that a conjugal act must intend reproduction, is called procreationism. Kathy Gaca (94, 255) finds its roots in Pythagorean eugenics, as transformed by Philo, adopted by Clement of Alexandria, and moderated by Augustine for whom fallen marital sexuality is a venial sin excused by the good of offspring. That is far from natalism (Augustine preferred abstinence (and even abstinence within marriage) above reproduction, as chapter 5 will show), and Catholicism now permits Natural Family Planning (NFP) as implied by Casti Connubii in 1930 and clarified by Pius XII in 1951 (Zimmerman 8). Humanae Vitae in 1968 contrasts two couples who are both “attempting to ensure that a child will not be born,” that is both have contraceptive intention, but only the couple using a method of timed abstinence is deemed to be acting morally: this is compatible with planning a small family size. Conversely, most Protestant natalists accept routine use of artificial contraceptives for timing and spacing births while advocating a high birth rate and large family size.*7*

The condemnation of intentional childlessness is not necessarily natalist. Many modern Protestants believe the “unitive and procreative ends of marriage” must not be divided but argue this applies at the level of the whole duration of a marriage (Mangina 476). This appears as the third item in the list of ideologies above. The implication that a deliberately childfree marriage is wrong is emphasized by Thielecke and others (Poulson 154). Where that is the only reason, urging such couples to have a child is not natalist, but the same exhortation if rooted in a desire for high birth rates would be natalist; and it could be a tactical step prior to urging higher reproductivity. The same is true for all seven of the ideas I noted as incidentally affecting birth rates. When they appear in writings that also advocate high fecundity, they function as part of a natalist agenda.

*1* I will ignore determinants such as the age of menopause, maternal mortality, and disease, which either vary little across a modern national population, or are not amenable to change through natalist exhortation at the individual or sectarian level.

*2* Phrases such as “age at marriage” continue to be standard terminology in demographic literature, though reproductive relationships other than marriage are included in the data under these euphemistic headings.

*3* An exception is vasectomy reversal, which Protestant natalists recommend.

*4* Arguably this might not raise fertility even in effect as well-trained practitioners of Natural Family Planning can apparently prevent conception as effectively as users of artificial contraceptives (Zimmerman).

*5* In demography “fertility” refers to the number of births and “fecundity” refers to a potential parent’s physical ability to reproduce, whereas in medicine the latter is referred to as fertility. I will use both terms as synonyms referring to the number of births.

*6* Many unlimited natalists identify themselves as “Quiverfull” (Joyce 134).

*7* The use of contraceptives to increase the surviving number of children (in situations of subsistence poverty) is further indication that anti-contraception is not the same as natalism.

Extract from pages 2-5 of John P. McKeown, “US Protestant natalist reception of Old Testament fruitful verses : A critique”, PhD thesis, Liverpool University, 2011.

Bibliography (for whole thesis), other downloads, and outline of chapters are archived online at University of Chester.

Rick Santorum : dangerous natalism

Two of the leading Republican candidates to become U.S. President in 2012 are pronatalist (advocates of higher birth rates). Rick Santorum in his book “It Takes A Family…” claims that “Europeans appear firmly committed to the most disastrous family trend of all: they are simply not having children. … What all of this means is that the nations of Europe are slowly dying off – sometimes not so slowly.” Another leader in Republican polls, Mitt Romney, in his speech exiting from the previous elections in 2008 similarly claimed that “Europe is facing a demographic disaster.”

These claims are perverse: Europe’s population is not only growing, but also currently has more births than deaths (EuroStat data is 5.36 million births and 4.84 million deaths, for EU-27 in 2010). Europe’s near-stable population is regarded by Santorum and Romney as a “demographic disaster” and a “dying off”. I can understand why Romney might be discontent with anything less than a Mormon rate of reproduction, but Santorum is a mainstream U.S. Christian so his ideas trouble me more. Europe’s total ecological footprint is already double its biocapacity (GFN 2011) so if there was population shrinkage it would be good, but so far Europe as a whole is not achieving that.

U.S. commentators are interested in Santorum’s opposition to federal support for family planning, and his view (unremarkable for a Catholic) that contraception is “harmful”, but [most] have not noticed that Santorum is also a natalist, just like many conservative Protestants and Southern Baptists. Update: I added [most] after seeing Politico’s report [below] that Santorum wants U.S. birth rates to rise and plans to increase Tax Credits for that purpose. I am disturbed by Santorum’s intention. The U.S. population already exceeds 300 million (back in 1900 it was 76 million). Also there is no lack of births in the USA: for example in 2008 there were 4.25 million births compared to 2.47 million deaths (Census Bureau), and even in 2011 (after a drop caused by recession) there were still 3.95 million births compared to 2.51 million deaths. Santorum’s policy would hurt America (by worsening its ecological overshoot) and the world.

Politico reporting Santorum’s desire for a higher U.S. birth rate, January 2012

Huffington Post on Santorum and birth control, 15 February 2012

Rush Limbaugh discusses Santorum and contraception, 16 February 2012

Mitt Romney’s exit speech from the 2008 presidential primaries

EuroStat data on births and deaths

Global Footprint Network

Death in the Iron Age

This book review by me appeared in the SOTS book list, an issue of the Journal of Old Testament Studies.

Some themes from the book are relevant to my PhD topic of natalism. Hays confirms in great detail that ancient Israelites, like many of their Near Eastern neighbours, regarded offspring and male heirs as the best way to overcome death, believing in proxy “immortality” through descendants rather than individual survival. Therefore numerous, healthy and strong offspring, already important for practical labour and support in old age, was vital to them also due to their perception of how a family line transcended individual extinction.

HAYS, CHRISTOPHER B., Death in the Iron Age II and in First Isaiah (Forschungen zum Alten Testament, 79; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), pp. xviii + 445. € 129.00. ISBN 978-3-16-150785-4 (hardback edition).

Hay’s 2008 dissertation is here revised and expanded. He explores links between cultural productions (such as burial, memorial, afterlife, fear of spirits, and ancestor cults) and the imagery of death in Isaiah 1-39.

Four chapters provide a valuable and near book-length (almost 200 pages) synthesis of ancient Near Eastern ideas about death, looking in turn at Mesopotamia, Egypt, ‘Syria-Palestine’, and Judah.

The first two chapters discuss ‘mechanisms of influence’ before considering details of culture as reflected in archaeology and texts.

Chapter 3 is mostly about Ugarit, and Hays justifies his use of Bronze Age evidence.

Chapter 4 offers an interesting review of death in Israel, Judah and the OT, including a helpful exploration of recent shifts in scholarship on afterlife ideas.

Hays then turns to Isaiah in his long chapter 5, which has 144 pages. He considers fourteen texts, and also numerous hôy oracles, from Isaiah 1-39. They are grouped under four headings: threats of an unhappy afterlife, comparing the living to the dead, responses to cults of the dead, and life’s triumph. A few of the ideas here have previously appeared in Hay’s articles in VT and ZAW.

The book is indexed by subject, author, and biblical text.

Approaches to Biblical Ethics

A review of the book by Eryl Davies, The Immoral Bible: Approaches to Biblical Ethics. London: T&T Clark, 2010. A shorter version of this review was published by the Society for Old Testament Studies in 2011.

What can a preacher or commentator do when confronted with Old Testament texts which modern readers regard as immoral? Eryl Davies provides a valuable survey of some approaches. His first chapter presents the problem through examples of offending texts: polygamy and slavery are condoned; legal penalties include mutilation (Dt 25:11), with capital punishment for homosexuality, adultery, blasphemy, and juvenile delinquency; some prophetic writings depict God as capricious, deceptive, or cruel; and the narratives ‘most likely to offend’ claim divine approval for military violence.

The subsequent chapters treat in turn six types of modern response: evolutionary, cultural relativist, canon-within-a-canon, canonical, paradigmatic, and reader-response. For each approach Davies offers a fascinating history of its development by biblical scholars, examples of how it has been used to handle various ‘immoral’ texts, and then an evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses. Each chapter also includes a case study based on Joshua 6-11, the ‘most abhorrent’ text and therefore the hardest test (13). Davies is evenhanded in his presentation of each approach, and his preference for reader-response is declared (2).

Many criteria are used in evaluating the approaches, and I will pick out a few for comment. First, it must save the relevance of OT scriptures for moral formation of faith communities. The evolutionary approach scores badly here as it devalues the OT to a mere preparation for New Testament study. The cultural relativist has no method to find ‘abiding relevance’ in OT law, and even the Ten Commandments lose universality (I wonder how modern it is, given that Luther suggests a similar idea in his sermon ‘How Christians Should Regard Moses’). The canon-within-a-canon method does not attempt a solution, rather it simply ignores problematic texts.

Another criterion is whether an approach is practical for use by ‘ordinary readers’ as well as scholars. The canonical method is ‘beyond the reach of most readers’ (87) and the paradigmatic method requires a knowledge of Israelite social systems (110). This highlights a tension concerning the type of Bible-readers in view. It is unfair to judge an approach by its practicability for readers without academic training; for if methods in science were judged by such a standard very few would be viable. On the other hand, as most Bible readers are not academically trained it is understandable that this is an issue.

Davies is acutely conscious of baleful reception, but often slips into language that imagines a modern consensus. For example, ‘nobody today would seriously entertain’ a death penalty for homosexual behaviour (54), but that is falsified by some Protestant fundamentalists. With regard to Joshua 6-11 and Deuteronomy 20:16-18, Davies imagines a ‘feeling of revulsion that modern readers … are bound to experience when reading’ such texts (14). However even for this extreme case dissenters exist; for example Gary North in Political Polytheism approves Joshua’s conquest and sees in ‘the advent of the European in North America a righteous historical judgment of God … the Indians were the moral and covenantal equivalent of the Canaanites’ (1989: 257). Davies nuances his generalisation elsewhere, as a ‘moral consensus shared by all thoughtful and sensitive people’ (113), but (in the absence of survey data) first-person language would be better.

Traditional approaches do not receive much attention. In his first chapter Davies observes that concern about the morality of OT scripture is not a modern novelty, and he mentions the ‘spiritual exposition’ developed by the Church Fathers. While conceding that ‘allegory’ may be appropriate for the Song of Songs, for most ‘immoral’ texts he judges that ‘few today would regard such strategies as an effective solution’ (17). That rejection is too brief given the recent revival of interest in Patristic commentary, drawing on traditions of christological, ecclesiological, and other spiritual exegeses of OT scripture, as resources for interpretation.

Davies finds a hopeful way forward in reader-response approaches. These enable metacommentary on past works of biblical scholarship that evaded ethical responsibility. Constructive approaches to biblical criticism are not merely self-reflection because they build tools from the canon’s internal self-critique, and they enter a conversation in which the Bible also challenges the modern reader. Davies’ book is a careful overview of approaches to the general problem of scriptures whose morality is troubling, and would benefit any student of the Bible, especially those training for Christian ministry and preaching.

John P. McKeown, 2010.

U.S. Protestant Natalism and Martin Luther

Author version (submission before editing, no page numbers) of an article published as McKeown, John P. “Receptions of Israelite nation-building: Modern Protestant Natalism and Martin Luther.” in Dialog: A Journal of Theology 49(2), pp. 133-140. Web version follows below. PDF is available to download from University of Chester repository.

Abstract: Ancient nation-building demanded fecundity and traces of this lie dormant in Old Testament scriptures. In the USA today some Protestants preach natalism (an ideology promoting high fecundity) often with the objective shifted from national preservation to denominational aggrandizement. Some present Martin Luther as a forerunner of natalism and this article evaluates that claim, looking at his thought on reproduction in historical and theological context.

The published version is listed at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/123521987/abstract

Continue reading U.S. Protestant Natalism and Martin Luther